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Judaism without Ordinary Law:
Toward a Broader View
of Sanctification
By Jonathan R. Cohen

I

n the second chapter of Judaism
as a Civilization, Rabbi Mordecai
M. Kaplan makes a remarkable
assertion: “[T]he elimination of the
civil code from Jewish life has, in fact,
administered as severe a blow to Judaism as the destruction of the Jewish
commonwealth”(Kaplan, 17).1
The political emancipation of the
Jew, beginning in France in 1791 and
then spreading elsewhere, both gave
and took. With the granting of full civil
rights to Jews came the loss of much of
Jewish law as a functioning legal system,
since the secular legal system replaced
the Jewish legal system for most ordinary disputes. Functionally speaking,
the basic law-in-practice as known by
most Diaspora Jews, including American Jews, became the secular law.2 If a
neighbor damages your property or a
business partner breaches a contract,
your must sue them in the civil court
to recover. Whether the neighbor or
the business partner is a fellow Jew
is essentially irrelevant. The operative
law and the legal system that will address the dispute are secular ones. As a
by-product of political emancipation,

Jewish law-in-function was essentially
relegated to the ritual realm. This applied not simply to progressive or liberal
branches of Judaism, but to traditional
ones, too. As Kaplan wrote, “[T]he
most important elements of Jewish law
are as obsolete in Neo-Orthodoxy as
they are in Reformism.” We learn that
Neo-Orthodoxy accepts with equanimity the elimination of the whole civil
code of Jewish law, and is content to
confine the scope of Jewish law to ritual
observance” (Kaplan, 157).3

Differences in Gravity
Upon first reading Kaplan’s statements, I reacted strongly. While I
suspected some hyperbole (could the
replacement of much operative Jewish
law with civil law really compare to the
destruction of the Jewish commonwealth?),4 Kaplan’s words struck a deep
chord. As one who is both a law professor — a professor of American law and
legal practice — and a Jew, I know how
different the functioning of civil law
can feel from that of ritual law.
Let me give two examples. My wife
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and I have had numerous discussions
about kashrut, addressing “legal” questions such as what level of hekhsher to
require of foods, what to say to dinner guests who wish to bring a dish
to our home and so on. By contrast,
I recall when serving as a law clerk to
an appellate judge discussing with that
judge whether a defendant’s conviction
should be overturned for evidentiary
error, a decision that would determine
whether that person would spend the
next decade in prison. My wife and I
consider our kashrut decisions carefully. We attempt to articulate general
principles underlying our decisions
rather than deciding cases ad hoc. Yet,
no matter how seriously we take them,
the gravity of our kashrut decisions is
simply of a different order of magnitude than a decision that determines
whether a human being will remain
incarcerated for much of his life.
As I pondered Kaplan’s words, my
mind began turning his statements into
questions. How has the relegation of
Jewish law to the ritual realm affected
the role of the rabbi? What does it
mean that rabbis rarely serve as judges
in real human disputes? How has this
shift affected the lives of other Jews?
For example, Jews wishing to work in
the law-in-practice would have to undertake a secular rather than a religious
legal training. How would that affect
their lives? And what of the Jewish
wisdom and lore contained in now
largely inoperative sections of Jewish
legal texts like the Talmud?5 Would that
rich knowledge also be lost as civil law
replaced halakhah has operative law?
Numerous important questions
arise, far too many to address here.
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Rather, I shall confine myself to a single
question: How has the restriction of
operative Jewish law to the ritual realm
influenced our understanding of sanctification?

Visions of Sanctification
In response, I will suggest that restricting operative Jewish law to the
ritual realm may have brought with
it a narrowing of how we understand
sanctification — a narrowing we should
attempt to undo. Before explaining
this, let me make a request by way of
confession. Although I study Judaism
seriously, I am not an expert in it. My
primary expertise lies in American legal
practice — specifically, in legal dispute
resolution. That vantage point is of
aid as I approach the question above,
for it gives me an understanding of
an ordinary functional legal system
— that is, a legal system that exercises
real power to resolve actual disputes.
Yet as one not formally trained in
either history or Jewish thought, it is
with much humility that I approach
the religious, historical question of how
relegating operative Jewish law to the
ritual realm may have influenced our
understanding of sanctification. I ask
that readers approach the statements
below as hypotheses rather than as
conclusions, and hope that, should they
see fit, those versed in other fields will
evaluate and, where appropriate, refute
such speculations.
It may be helpful to begin by identifying two different, though not unrelated,
visions of sanctification (kedushah).
The first vision is sanctification as
separation from the ordinary, that
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is, kodesh vs. hol.
In the words of the
.
Orthodox Union, “The basic meaning [of kedushah] is separation from
the ‘general’ and dedication to the
particular” (http://www.ou.org/about/
judaism/jl.htm).This is the sense of
holiness we usually have in mind when
we think of Shabbat (as different from
ordinary days), of kashrut (as dividing
the kosher from the treif), and even of
marriage (as separating a couple from
participating in sexual relations with all
others through kedushin). Separation
lies at the core of such fundamental
Jewish ritual building blocks. Further,
much ritual effort is devoted to marking the lines of separation. Candles are
lit at the beginning and end of Shabbat.
Much energy is devoted to kashering
a kitchen when moving into a new
home. The wedding process is usually
marked by a sense of ceremony, often
with many guests invited.
The second vision is sanctification as
elevating or improving. When we announce in the Kedushah, “Holy, Holy,
Holy is the Lord of Hosts; the whole
world is full of God’s glory,” it is not
that we are seeing God as separate from
our world. Rather, we are seeing God
as permeating and elevating our world.
Sanctification, in other words, can be
viewed as a direction.
Often, the first vision of sanctification as separation and the second vision of sanctification as elevation exist
simultaneously. Shabbat is a holy day
not merely because it is a separate day,
but because that separation is in the direction of elevation toward greater joy,
fulfillment and rest. Even the solemn
Yom Kippur — the holiest of days — is
ultimately oriented toward elevation
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(through teshuvah). Note, however, that
this second vision of sanctification need
not be tied to that of separation. It is
possible to improve or elevate something without separating from it.

Legal Implications
As mentioned, in the ritual realm,
Jewish law centrally concerns itself
with promoting sanctification through
the process of separation. Jewish ritual
law seeks to construct a world in which
the holy is separated from the ordinary.
Moreover, the fact that Jewish law
provides the parameters of such ritualized activity helps to authenticate the
religious foundation of such activity.
Part of what helps the ordinary Jew to
feel holiness through such rituals is that
Jewish law provides for these rituals.
By contrast, in the non-ritual realm,
separation is not the hallmark of
sanctification. Though analysis and
classification are of course important
to non-ritual Jewish law, separation
per se is not especially so. If one’s ox
gores a neighbor’s ox, the central legal
issue is not whether an ox is or is not
a kosher animal. Rather, as with most
types of ordinary law, the central legal
question is what remedy should ensue.5
Ordinary Jewish law does not pursue
the construction of binary categories.
Yet this does not mean that there is no
sanctification to be found. Quite the
reverse. Often, for people in the midst
of conflict, great sanctity is experienced
when that conflict is resolved, whether
by mutual agreement or by a legal
award. The critical point is that such
sanctification — as with much of the
sanctification in our world — is to be
The Reconstructionist

found not by separating off from ordinary life, but by going through it. Indeed, were a comparison to be made, I
suspect that such sanctification through
ordinary life “exceeds” sanctification
vs. ordinary life in importance. What
we do on the six days of the week ultimately has more to say about whether
we lead a sanctified life than what we
do on Shabbat.
We can now see a root problem that
may have arisen with the restriction of
operative Jewish law to the ritual realm.
Both because the basic forms of sanctification are different and because the
imprimatur of Jewish legal authority no
longer attaches to the ordinary realm,
many Jews no longer recognize ordinary
life as sacred, or at least as an activity
that can be sanctified. For many Jews,
the non-ritual realm has lost much of
its religious significance.
Perhaps an example will help convey
this. Recently, I presented a d’var torah
to my havurah and shared the thesis of
this essay. A mother responded with a
story about her six-year-old daughter.
Until this year, the girl had attended
our community’s Jewish preschool, but
had since switched to public school.
After several weeks in public school,
the daughter asked her mother (I
paraphrase), “What does it mean to be
Jewish in public school? Does being
Jewish in public school mean keeping
kosher and keeping Shabbat?” The
girl’s questions focus upon ritual Jewish life. In one sense, no doubt, she is
right: Kashrut and Shabbat are critical,
distinctive aspects of being Jewish in the
multicultural world of public school.
Yet what about the matter of how one
treats others? Is not that central to being
The Reconstructionist

Jewish as well? Is not “Thou shalt not
steal” (a commandment quite relevant
to young children) among the Ten
Commandments, along with keeping
Shabbat? My point is that the girl’s
questions may reflect a view of Judaism as restricted to ritual Judaism. If
so, what a loss this is. If we cannot see
the sacred in ordinary life, much of our
vision of the sacred has been lost.

Separation and the Sacred
I close with four final notes.
First, affirming the value of the sacred
in ordinary life — the sacred through
— is not to denigrate the importance
of the ritual sacred. Separation — the
sacred verse — is often sadly neglected.
The pursuit of the sacred through
should not come at the expense of the
sacred vs. Indeed, the two are usually complementary. Experiencing the
sanctity of Shabbat can help us pursue
sanctity in the other days of the week,
and vice versa. At a deep level, the
dialectical construction of the sacred
through vs.the sacred vs. may blur.
Second, much of the ritual sacred
concerns either emotionally powerful
life-cycle events (such as birth, bar/
bat mitzvah, marriage, divorce and
death) or emotionally powerful Jewish
calendar events (such as holidays and
Shabbat). Further, many but not all of
these events are uplifting experiences.
By contrast, the sacred through is often
much more mundane. It concerns the
challenges of ordinary life. Life can be
unpleasant. Life can be boring. The
sacred through focuses not upon the
liminal, but upon the typical. Yet that
is precisely why it is so important. It is
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easy to sense holiness at the moment of
a child’s birth. It is harder when changing diapers. However, for every one
birth, there are thousands of diapers to
change. That is why finding holiness in
the ordinary is essential.
Third, let me share a few brief
thoughts about what one might call
Jewish “sacred knowledge.” Often, we
think of Jewish sacred knowledge as
knowledge about the ritual domains
of Jewish life — to follow the questions of the six-year-old, knowledge
about things like keeping Shabbat
and kashrut. Yet knowledge about the
nonritual domains of life — more
specifically, knowledge about how to
appreciate and elevate those domains
— should also be viewed as sacred
knowledge. Our respect for ritual
knowledge, in other words, should not
make us insensitive to the sacred value
of other life knowledge. Before the functional restriction of Jewish knowledge
to the ritual realm, such a prioritization
of ritual knowledge over other sacred
knowledge made little sense. There
was no reason to give preference to
knowledge of the laws of kashrut over
knowledge of the laws of contracts, since
both addressed operative law. It is critical that we respect sacred knowledge in
both ritual and nonritual areas.
Fourth and finally, broadening our
vision of the sacred may help Jews who
live in a largely secular world have a
greater sense of religiosity and perhaps
even integration in their lives. In one
of his final orations, Moses declares to
the children of Israel, “This instruction
(mitzvah) which I enjoin upon you
this day is not hidden from you, nor
is it far off. It is not in the heavens (lo
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ba-shamayim hi), that you should say,
‘Who shall go up for us to heaven, and
bring it to us, that we may hear it, and
do it?’ ”(Deuteronomy 30: 11-12)6

Life of Torah
There are many lessons to be found
in these lines. The rabbis, of course,
used this passage as a proof text for
their power to interpret and determine
Jewish law, for the Torah was “not in the
heavens” but here on earth (Babylonian
Talmud, Bava Metzi’a 59b). Perhaps
the simplest reading is that of rebuttal:
Were Jews to assert that they could
not follow the Jewish law because they
could not obtain or understand it, such
a claim would be false. Let me suggest
a third reading — namely, that a life
of Torah (and here I mean Torah in
the broadest sense) can be all-enveloping. It is not “hidden” or “far off,” but
can guide and infuse life throughout,
from birth to death, in things large and
small. To borrow Abimelech’s words to
Abraham, it is the sense that “God is
with you in everything that you do”
(Genesis 21: 22).

Recognizing Sanctification
With the functional constriction of
Jewish law to the ritual, it is easy to
relegate Torah and, with it, our sense
of sanctification, to the ritual. Such is
a great loss. Recognizing sanctification
as not only separation but also elevation
may help us see the possibility of pursuing sanctification throughout our lives.
In other words, the legal constriction
produced by history should not become
a spiritual one as well.
The Reconstructionist

1. Kaplan’s usage of “civil law,” which I follow in this essay, is in the civil- vs.-religious
sense, rather than the civil- vs.-criminal
sense.
2. I do not here address the question of
to what extent the lives of Israeli Jews are
governed by Jewish law. Kaplan’s view was
that, even within the State of Israel, the effective scope of Jewish law was quite limited
through the restriction of rabbinical courts
to questions of personal status (e.g., marriage, conversion, etc.). See Mordecai M.
Kaplan, Questions Jews Ask: Reconstructionist Answers (New York: Reconstructionist
Press, 1956; 1972), 323. For secondary
discussions of Kaplan’s approach to Jewish
law generally, see Ronald A. Brauner, ed.,
Jewish Civilization: Essays and Studies: Jewish Law, Vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Reconstructionist Rabbinical College, 1981).
3. Observe that many of the subjects
most contested among various branches
of contemporary American Judaism (e.g.,
patrilineal descent, rabbinical ordination
of women and gay marriage ceremonies)
concern matters of ritual law. No great
internecine battles are being waged over
criminal penalties, tort damages, evidentiary
standards and so forth.
4. In Questions Jews Ask, Kaplan later discusses this change in less dramatic terms.
Id. at 323.
5. Consider, for example, the glorious Mishnaic passage proclaiming the worth, equality
and uniqueness of every human life:
Therefore was the first man, Adam,
created alone, to teach us that whoever destroys a single life, the Bible
considers it as if he destroyed an
entire world. . . . Furthermore, only
one man, Adam, was created for the
sake of peace among men, so that
no one should say to his fellow, “My
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father was greater than yours.” . . .
Also, man [was created singly] to show
the greatness of the Holy One, Blessed
be He, for if a man strikes many coins
from one mold, they all resemble one
another, but the King of Kings, the
Holy One, Blessed be He, made each
man in the image of Adam, and yet
not one of them resembles his fellow.
(Sanhedrin 4:5)
This passage is found, quite poignantly,
as part of the instructions to given to witnesses before testifying in capital cases.
With the relegation of Jewish law to the
ritual realm, such a subject is no longer
strictly “necessary.” Perhaps this passage is
sufficiently famous that it will not be “lost,”
but one senses the risk. Many Jewish legal
texts contain much more than simply law.
Without the need for the law, such “more”
may be lost.
5. The question of what remedy should
ensue is often far less salient when it comes
to ritual law. Violations of ritual law may
roughly be seen as violations between a
person and God (bein adam l’Makom),
while the violations of ordinary law are
typically violations between a person and
another person (bein adam l’haveiro).
Though specifying remedies for ritual
violations is, of course, possible
(think
.
of Leviticus’ elaborate sacrificial system),
generally speaking, the remedial focus is
more immediate and clear for nonritual
law than for ritual law. For non-ritual transgressions, there is often a present need for
compensation of the injured party, as well
as the risk of vigilantism should that need
not be officially addressed.
6. Though mitzvah is in the singular, the
sense in which it is normally understood
is a broad one, a reading supported by the
attendant text. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 29:
28, 30: 10 and 30: 16.
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